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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in summarily dismissing the Petition 
For Post-Conviction Relief for untimely filing even though Appellant had no notice 
of the prosecutorial misconduct claims ("First Ground") or the scientific basis for 
his actual innocence claim ("Second Ground"), his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim ("Third Ground"), or his claim to test the biological evidence for DNA 
("Fourth Ground") until he consulted an expert out of an abundance of caution, and 
even though neither trial defendants nor postconviction petitioners have any 
obligation to search for evidence of prosecutorial misdeeds, absent notice of their 
existence, 
2. Whether the district court applied the wrong legal standard to determine whether 
Appellant was entitled to equitable tolling and, alternatively, whether in any event 
Appellant met the standard the district court erroneously employed. 
iv 
ARGUMENT 
THE PROSECUTION ENGAGED IN PROFOUND MISCONDUCT 
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE SUPPRESSION OF 
EXONERATING EVIDENCE AND THE ELICITING OF FALSE 
TESTIMONY CRITICAL TO MR. RHOADES' CONVICTION AND 
WHICH IT KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN WAS FALSE, ALL OF 
WHICH SHOULD HA VE BEEN FOUND TO EQUITABLY TOLL THE 
FILING DEADLINE FOR MR. RHOADES' POSTCONVICTION 
PETITION IN WHICH HE SOUGHT RELIEF BASED ON THAT SAME 
PROFOUND MISCONDUCT. 
In the court below, Mr. Rhoades contended that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the 
limitations period for filing his post-conviction petition because his grounds for relief were based 
on plainly exculpatory facts suppressed by the prosecution and because he was entitled as a 
matter of state and federal constitutional Jaw to rely on the prosecution abiding its legal 
obligations and, therefore, was under no obligation to hunt for prosecutorial misconduct absent 
notice of same. He also contended that he filed his post-conviction petition soon after 
uncovering the illegally suppressed exculpatory evidence. The State correctly notes that the 
district court summarily dismissed Mr. Rhoades's post-conviction petition on the ground that he 
had "failed to establish any factual basis warranting equitable tolling." Brief of Respondent at 10. 
As the court below put it, Petitioner's contention that the prosecution had withheld exculpatory 
evidence and suborned perjury was an "illogical and grandiose inference drawn from one 
expert's opinion." R. 90 (Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Summary Dismissal 
["Memorandum Decision"] at 6). That court continued: 
Petitioner has failed to present an iota of evidence that the prosecution knew of an 
alternative interpretation of the FBI's PGM report at the time of trial and 
deliberately withheld that info1mation form Petitioner. Petitioner has failed to 
present even a scintilla of evidence of [sic] that the serological expert's testimony 
was perjured, let alone at the elicitation of the prosecution. Simply put, Petitioner 
has not presented any evidence to the Court of wrongdoing on the part of the 
prosecution. 
[Thus,] Petitioner has wholly failed to establish that he is entitled to 
equitable tolling ofl.C. §§19-4902(a) and (b). Absent equitable tolling, Petitioner 
has not met the timeliness requirements of those statutes and the instant petition is 
summarily dismissed, with prejudice. 
R. 91 (Memorandum Decision at 7). 
In fact, however, Mr. Rhoades presented substantial material evidence and factual 
allegations to the court below which demonstrates that court's clear error in finding that Mr. 
Rhoades is not entitled to equitable tolling of the applicable limitations period. The State does 
not dispute any of Mr. Rhoades's factual allegations and other supporting documents made in 
support of equitable tolling. Specifically, other than transcript excerpts, Mr. Rhoades filed with 
the court below the following documents in support of his post-conviction petition: 
(l) the FBI document dated about six months pre-trial which memorialized the 
results of its more refined PGM testing, as compared to the PGM testing for the 
prosecution by the state laboratory, of swabs of semen removed from the victim's 
mouth and vagina' (see R. 30, Supporting Affidavit at Appendix I); 
(2) a June 20, 2005, sworn statement from Greg Hampikian, Ph.D., an expert in 
forensic biology and then a Boise University associate professor with a joint 
appointment in Biology and Criminal Justice Administration,2 in which he noted 
that while the State ofldaho Forensic Laboratory testing on swabs of semen 
removed from the victim "did not exclude Mr. Rhoades as a potential 
'The state laboratory and the FBI both conducted what is referred to 
phosophoglucomutase ("PGM") testing. PGM is a kind of genetic marker which may be found 
in bodily fluids. Bodily fluids containing PGM can be analyzed to determine the contributor's 
particular PGM features. There are less refined and more refined kinds of PGM testing. As 
noted in the text, the FBI testing was more refined, as compared to that conducted by the state 
laboratory. 
2Since attesting to that statement, Boise State University has promoted Dr. Hampikian to 
full professor and granted him tenure. 
2 
contributor of the semen[,) .. . the more refined test performed by the FBI3, at 
the request of the Idaho lab, did absolutely exclude Mr. Rhoades as a 
contributor of the semen." R. at 34 (Supporting Affidavit at Exhibit 2, p. 2, para. 
6) ( emphasis added). 
(3) A December 21, 2006, sworn statement from Dr. Hampikian noting that the 
FBI' s more refined testing was the more discriminating ( as compared to the state 
laboratory's testing) and the then-established state of the art forensic PGM 
subtyping test. Dr. Hampikian continued: 
It is accepted forensic science that less discriminating test results 
must be interpreted in light of subsequent more discriminating test 
results. Considering less discriminating test results and ignoring 
subsequent, more discriminating and, therefore, definitive results 
in unacceptable forensic scientific practice. Basing a conclusion 
solely on the State laboratory's PGM test when the FBI's more 
discriminating test results were available would make little sense, 
assuming that the goal was a reliable conclusion. I have read Mr. 
Wyckoff s and all other relevant trial testimony regarding the 
State's PGM testing as well as the State's and FBI laboratory 
reports and correspondence. It is troubling that while Mr. 
Rhoades' jurors learned of the State's PGM test results, they were 
never presented testimony or documents regarding the FBI's more 
discriminating PGM test results. This omission promoted the 
incorrect inference that Mr. Rhoades was a possible contributor of 
the detected PGM; in fact, the FBI's results excluded him. 
R. at 84 (Attachment to Affidavit In Support Of Opposition To Motion For Summary Dismissal 
Based Upon Statute of Limitations at 2). 
The State disputes none of these assertions. Instead, it advances four arguments why the 
evidence just noted together with the transcript excerpts filed by Mr. Rhoades do not entitle him 
to equitable tolling, i.e.- why they fail to establish that the prosecution withheld exculpatory 
evidence and/or suborned perjury. Brief of Respondent at 13. Generally, the State's arguments 
suffer from a failure to account for two long-settled legal rules. First, the State fails to account 
3Here, Dr. Hampikian is referring to the same FBI test results memorialized in the FBI 
document attached to the affidavit as Exhibit l and dated about six months pre-trial. 
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for the legal rule that a prosecutor's duty to seek out exculpatory information from all 
government agents acting on behalf of the prosecution in a case is not satisfied merely because 
the prosecution's expert fails to obtain available exculpatory evidence, fails to understand the 
obvious exculpatory import of that evidence, or fails to communicate his knowledge of that 
evidence and its exculpatory import to the prosecuting attorneys. This Court as well as the 
Supreme Court have addressed this in no uncertain terms. State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 781, 
979 P .2d 648, 654 (Idaho 1999) ("The duty of disclosure enunciated in Brady [ v. Maryland, 3 73 
U.S. 83 (1963)] is an obligation of not just the individual prosecutor assigned to the case, but of 
all the government agents having a significant role in investigating and prosecuting the offense.") 
(quoting State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428,433, 885 p.2d 1144, 1149 (Ct.App., 1994)); Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995) (Individual prosecutors are duty-bound "to learn of any 
favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the 
police. But whether the prosecutor succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation (whether, that is, a 
failure to disclose is in good faith or bad faith, see Brady[], the prosecution's responsibility for 
failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is 
inescapable."). Second, the State's arguments fail to account for the legal rule that defendants 
are entitled to rely on the government's representations as truthful. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 
668, 698 (2004). In Banks, the State urged "that 'the prosecution can lie and conceal and the 
prisoner still has the burden to ... discover the evidence,' ... so long as the 'potential existence' of 
a prosecutorial misconduct claim might have been detected." Id at 696. The Supreme Court 
rejected that position, explaining: 
A rule thus declaring "prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek," is not tenable 
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in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process. "Ordinarily, 
we presume that public officials have properly discharged their official duties." 
Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899,909 (1997) (quoting United States v. Chemical 
Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)). We have several times underscored 
the "special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in 
criminal trials." Strickler [v. Greene], 527 U.S. [263,) 281 [1999); accord, Kyles, 
514 U.S., at 439-440; United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,675, n. 6 (1985); 
Berger [v. United States], 295 U.S.[78), 88 [1935). See also Olmsteadv. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438,484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Courts, litigants, and 
juries properly anticipate that "obligations [to refrain from improper methods to 
secure a conviction] ... plainly rest[ing] upon the prosecuting attorney, will be 
faithfully observed." Berger, 295 U.S., at 88. Prosecutors' dishonest conduct or 
unwarranted concealment should attract no judicial approbation. See Kyles, 514 
U.S., at 440 ("The prudence of the careful prosecutor should not ... be 
discouraged."). 
The State's arguments also fail to distinguish between the legal impact the prosecution's forensic 
expert's actual knowledge or ignorance of operative facts would have on the different grounds 
for relief Mr. Rhoades set out in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief For example, while his 
ignorance of operative facts would mean his testimony contradicting those facts was not 
perjurious, it would have no effect on Mr. Rhoades' prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. See, e.g., Blanton v. Blackburn, 494 F.Supp. 895 (M .. D. La. 1980), 
ajf'd, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981) (new trial ordered where, among other things, prosecutor 
failed to correct testimony which it knew or should have known was false, even though 
witnesses' answer to questions were technically correct); United States v. Alzate, 4 7 F.3d 1103 
(11 th Cir. 1995) (prosecutor's failure to correct representations he made to jury which were 
damaging to duress defense was Brady violation requiring new trial); United States v. Vozzella, 
124 F .3d 3 89 (2"d Cir. 1997) ( conviction reversed where prosecution presented false evidence 
and elicited misleading testimony concerning that evidence which was vital to prove the charge); 
Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1986) (habeas relief granted under Giglio where 
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prosecution allowed its key witness to testify falsely, failed to correct that testimony, and 
exploited it in closing argument). In what follows, Mr. Rhoades demonstrates that the State's 
four arguments that Mr. Rhoades is not entitled to equitable tolling fail, largely because they 
cannot be squared with these legal principles. 
First, the State argues, "if the prosecuting attorneys should have known of the report's 
meaning, [Mr.] Rhoades' attorney should also have known of its meaning." Brief of Respondent 
at 13. Even assuming Mr. Rhoades' trial counsel should have known of the FBI report's 
meaning, defense counsel's ignorance of its meaning does not release the prosecution from either 
its duty to correct false testimony from its witnesses or its duty to provide exculpatory 
information to the defense. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1061-62 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 
U.S. 942 (2002) (Brady violation found where defense knew of the existence of prosecution 
expert but did not know that the expert's opinion was exculpatory); Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 
385, 392 (9th Cir. I 997) (same); Turner v. Schriver, 327 F.Supp.2d 174 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(violation of due process based upon admission of perjured testimony which the prosecutor 
should have known was false). Further, there can be no disputing in this case that defense 
counsel did not know that the FBI report was exculpatory. As the State notes in its answering 
brief, Mr. Rhoades' post-conviction petition makes plain that trial counsel consulted a serology 
expert. Brief of Respondent at 14. However, because trial counsel failed to provide that expert 
with sufficient and available information regarding the FBI testing to allow that expert to discern 
that the testing exonerated Petitioner, it is beyond question that trial counsel did not appreciate 
the FBI report's exculpatory value. R. 12-13 (Petition For Post-Conviction Relief at 10-11. 
Additionally, the prosecuting attorneys should have known of the report's meaning. Kyles; 
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Avelar; Gantt v. Roe, 389 F.3d 908, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2004) ("While the defense could have been 
more diligent. .. this does not absolve the prosecution of its Brady responsibilities."). Though he 
disputes the State's suggestion that whatever the prosecution should know about a report's 
meaning, the defense necessarily should know as well, Mr. Rhoades agrees that on the facts of 
this case, his trial counsel should have known that the FBI's report was exculpatory. Because 
there can be no serious question that but for this woefully inadequate performance in this regard, 
the outcome would have been different. The Court should vacate Mr. Rhoades' conviction and 
remand for further proceedings in this case. See R. 12-13 (Petition For Post-Conviction Relief at 
10-11 ( stating third ground for relief that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
in failing to provide defense expert with sufficient and available infonnation regarding the FBI 
testing to allow that expert to discern that the testing exonerated Petitioner). Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
Second, the State asserts that "there is no evidence establishing Wyckoff was ever given a 
copy of the FBI report[.]" Id In fact, however, the evidence is plain that the State's forensic 
expert Mr. Wyckoff either knew what the FBI PGM test results were and/or had a copy of the 
FBI test report. That report was sent to the state crime lab, and Mr. Wyckoff was the state crime 
lab employee in charge of the forensic investigation in this case. Further, in testifying at the 
Michelbacher trial, he made clear that he was aware of the report. R. 7 (Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief at 5 (quoting Michelbacher trial Tr. at 1779)). As the forensic expert in the 
case, it strains credulity to contend that he may have been unaware of the results of FBI testing 
done at the instance of the state crime laboratory, which results were sent to that lab. 
Most important, however, except for the claim that Mr. Wyckoff committed the 
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functional equivalent of perjury, it does not matter whether Mr. Wyckoff had a copy of the FBI 
report, or was aware of its contents or even its contents' implications. It is black letter law that 
"the duty of disclosure enunciated in Brady is an obligation of not just the individual prosecutor 
assigned to the case, but of all the government agents having a significant role in investigating 
and prosecuting the offense." State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 885 P.2d 1144 (Ct.App. 1994) 
(citing Fambo v. Smith, 433 F.Supp. 590,598 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 
1977)) (emphasis added). See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (1995) ("the individual 
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government's behalf in the case[.]"). Even supposing Mr. Wyckoff somehow remained ignorant 
of the results of FBI testing conducted and sent to the state crime lab on a major piece of 
evidence in a case in which he was the forensic expert, that does not work to excuse the 
prosecuting attorneys from their duty to learn of the report and its implications. A corollary to 
that obligation is the prosecution's duty to correct false testimony. The prosecution did the exact 
opposite. It failed to correct Mr. Wyckoff's patently false testimony that PGM testing inculpated 
Mr. Rhoades when it knew or should have known that FBI testing exculpated him. Kyles, 514 
U.S. at 433 (Brady violated "where previously undisclosed evidence revealed that the 
prosecution introduced trial testimony that it knew or should have known was perjured, [ United 
States v. Agurs,] 427 U.S. (97,] I 03-04 [ 1976]"). 
Third, the State contends that there is "no evidence establishing that [Mr. Wyckoff, the 
prosecution's forensic expert,] could not have reviewed the report and simply arrived at a 
different conclusion or not recognized the meaning of the report as alleged by Dr. Hampikian." 
Brief of Respondent at 13-14. This contention is flawed at the start because it wrongly assumes 
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that unless Mr. Wyckoff arrived at the same conclusions as Dr. Hampikian, Mr. Rhoades's 
claims fail. While Mr. Wyckoff may not have committed perjury unless he recognized the 
exculpatory nature of the FBI' s testing results, that does not in any way excuse the prosecution 
from its due process obligation to learn of all exculpatory information known to those acting on 
behalf of the prosecution. State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428,885 P.2d 1144 (Ct.App. 1994) ("all 
the government agents having a significant role in investigating and prosecuting the offense" are 
subject to the duty of disclosure); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (I 995) ("the individual 
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government's behalf in the case[.]"). 
Even on its own terms, however, the State's contention fails. The only evidence before 
the court below relevant to this question came from Dr. Hampikian, who earned a doctorate in 
Genetics, completed post-doctoral training at La Trobe University in Australia and the Worcester 
Foundation for Developmental Biology in Massachusetts, completed the Mitochondrial DNA 
Analysis workshop offered by the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, was trained at Yale 
University in the technique used in PGM analysis used in this case, has been a researcher at Yale 
University Medical School, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Georgia 
Institute of Technology, and has trained law enforcement officers and other professionals in 
DNA analysis. In those parts of his sworn statements regarding the FBI's PGM testing before the 
court below, Dr. Hampikian makes plain that once the PGM values-specifically, pluses and 
minuses-are known, determining that the two samples in this case came from different single 
sources is elementary because Mr. Rhoades PGM has both a plus and a minus and the sample 
from the victim had only a plus. As Dr. Hampikian stated it: 
9 
The PGM subtype was PGMl+; Mr. Rhoades is PGMI-1+. This means that Mr. 
Rhodes [sic] has both the+ and· (acid and basic) forms of the PGM 1 protein. 
The semen sample was from someone who has only the l + form. 
R. 83 (Dr. Hampikian 12/21/06 sworn statement at para. !). There is no room for interpretation 
here. Likewise, there is no room for disagreement on whether the FBI more refined testing 
results trump the state laboratory's less refined testing results. As Dr. Hampikian averred: 
While the State's PGM testing in its own labs suggested that Mr. Rhoades was 
within the universe of individuals who might have deposited the semen, the FBI's 
more discriminating and established state of the art forensic PGM sub1yping test 
gave a contrary result. It is accepted forensic science that less discriminating test 
results must be interpreted in light of subsequent more discriminating test results. 
Considering less discriminating test results and ignoring subsequent, more 
discriminating and, therefore, definitive results is unacceptable forensic scientific 
practice. 
R. 84 (Dr. Hampikian 12/21/06 sworn statement at para. 3). Finally, in light of Mr. Wyckoffs 
holding himself out to be a serological expert with particularized knowledge of PGM analysis, it 
is so improbable as to be an absurd suggestion that Mr. Wyckoff did not recognize the 
exculpatory nature of the report. 
An inescapable conclusion from Dr. Hampikian's statements noted in the last paragraph 
is that any serological expert would agree that the FBI PGM testing results exculpated Mr. 
Rhoades. For, as is clear from the first block quotation, each person has only one form of the 
PGM l protein, and Mr. Rhoades's was not the same form as that tested by the FBI. Though Dr. 
Hampikian's statements noted above compel the conclusion that any serological expert would 
have reached the same conclusion as he did, thus making the express conclusion unnecessary, 
Mr. Rhoades notes that Dr. Hampikian did expressly reach that conclusion in his June, 2005, 
affidavit filed in the Michelbacher capital case post-conviction proceedings regarding DNA 
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testing and now before this Court on review as Case No. 34235.4 There, Dr. Hampikian averred 
that: 
[T]he kind of analysis I conducted to arrive at the conclusions I reached in my 
June 20, 2005, affidavit was not only universally accepted by forensic biologists 
and forensic serologists in 1987, it also was a basic tool known to and employed 
by forensic experts in investigating offenses where evidence containing body 
fluids might help uncover a perpetrators identity. The kind of analysis I employed 
using the FBI PGM subtyping test results was, in 1987, on a par with similar uses 
of blood typing test results. Indeed, the State crime laboratory letter to the FBI 
Laboratory's Forensic Serology Unit requesting PGM subtyping was a standard 
and typical request when it was made on June 3, 1987. See Appendix 1 (State of 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Bureau of Laboratories' senior 
Criminalist Ms. Pamela J. Marcum' s letter to FBI) .... Ms. Marcum' s 
correspondence shows clearly that the State of Idaho crime laboratory reflected 
the universal acceptance by forensic biologists and forensic serologists of PGM 
subtyping and the kind of analysis I conducted to reach the conclusion I arrived at 
in my June 20, 2005, affidavit. The results reported by the FBI in its July 13, 
1987, letter to Ms. Marcum were clear, unambiguous, and used a standard 
reporting language that would be understood by any forensic serologist or forensic 
biologist of the day. See appendix 2 (FBI Laboratory report to Ms. Marcum) ... 
. This result completely excludes Mr. Rhodes [sic] from being the donor of the 
semen sample found on the victim[.] .. furthermore, there is no indication in the 
FBI report that this finding could be an artifact, or that there was any evidence of a 
mixture in the sample. The standard and universally accepted conclusion in 
1987 (as today) is that the known sample from Paul Rhoades [sic] does not 
match the questioned semen sample (Ql) taken from the victim's body. Paul 
Rhoades is excluded as a contributor of the semen sample QI. 
R. Vol. I, p.199-202 (emphasis added). The State's contends that the Court should disregard this 
statement because it is not part of the record in this case. The court below certainly considered 
the Michelbacher file while presiding over this case. Not only was the same judge on both cases 
and the cases heard simultaneously on a variety of occasions, the judge also quoted from his 
order in that case. R. 90-91 (Memorandum Decision at 6-7). It is axiomatic that appellate courts 
4 Of course, the Michelbacher capital conviction, obtained through prosecutorial 
misconduct with respect to the PGM testing, is what led Mr. Rhoades to enter an Alford plea in 
this case. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 11 and Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
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review the record considered by the courts below. Mr. Rhoades will file in the immediate future 
a motion asking that the Court either take judicial notice of, among other things, Dr. Hampikian's 
June, 2005, affidavit filed in the Michelbacher DNA proceeding or expand the record to include 
that affidavit. He notes that the court below obviously considered those proceedings inasmuch as 
it quoted an from order it entered in them. 
Fourth, the State notes that Mr. Rhoades's allegations in his post-conviction petition 
reveal that he provided the FBI testing report to a defense expert. From this, the State concludes 
that either Mr. Rhoades was aware of the exculpatory nature of the FBI report at trial "or his 
expert agreed with Wyckoff, ifhe was actually provided a copy of the report, that it failed to alter 
the conclusion that Rhoades could not be excluded as a semen donor in the Michelbacher case." 
Brief of Respondent at 14. The State's contention fails for two reasons. First, there is no record 
evidence whatsoever supporting in any way the State's assertion that Mr. Wyckoff concluded that 
the FBI testing results "failed to alter the conclusion that Rhoades could not be excluded as a 
semen donor in the Michelbacher case." Id. In fact, the only record evidence on this issue is Mr. 
Wyckoffs Michelbacher trial testimony regarding the FBI test results: "I can't address those 
results, I did not do the analysis." R. 7 (Petition For Post-Conviction Relief at 5). Second, the 
State's summary of Mr. Rhoades's allegations in his post-conviction petition omits critical 
information. The devil is in the details, and the details here demonstrate that the defense expert's 
presumed agreement with Mr. Wyckoff s false testimony was based on a critical lack of 
information -information which defense expert did not but which Wyckoff did have. In 
particular, Mr. Rhoades alleged in his post-conviction petition that: 
They [i.e.-trial counsel] failed to provide their forensic expert in the companion 
12 
[i.e.-the Michelbacher] case] with sufficient and available information regarding 
the PGM testing conducted by the FBI on the swabs collected from the victim and 
the samples conducted from Petitioner and others to allow that expert to discern 
that the FBI PGM report exonerated Petitioner. Likewise, in the underlying case 
[i.e.-the case underlying the instant case before this Court], they failed to provide 
a forensic expert with sufficient and available information regarding the PGM 
testing conducted by the FBI on the swabs collected from the victim and the 
samples conducted from Petitioner and others to allow that expert to discern that 
the FBI PGM report exonerated Petitioner. Their expert questioned whether the 
swab contained spermatozoa or, instead, the victim's cells. Trial counsel had 
information available to them that each of the swabs represented excellent semen 
samples. Upon information and belief, had this information been provided to the 
defense expert, he would have modified his opinion from one which neutralize the 
FBI report to one which viewed it as plainly exculpatory. Upon information and 
belief, this failure also precluded counsel from appreciating the critical need to 
pursue forensic testing of all available biological evidence. 
R. 13 (Petition/or Post-Conviction Relief at 11). The State's contention that the defense expert 
agreed with Wyckoff regarding the FBI PGM testing results is a highly superficial and extremely 
misleading account of what in fact occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons and all the reasons advanced in Mr. Rhoades's opening brief, 
considered together and independently, the Court should either grant post-conviction relief or 
remand the case to the district court with instructions to conduct further proceedings on the 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
13 
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